The English Statute of Frauds in Washington by Neff, John I.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 34 Number 1 
3-1-1959 
The English Statute of Frauds in Washington 
John I. Neff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John I. Neff, Comment, The English Statute of Frauds in Washington, 34 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 124 
(1959). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol34/iss1/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
THE ENGLISH STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN WASHINGTON
JOHN L. NEFF
The English statute of frauds' has been in effect for almost four
centuries. The requirement of a writing, which that statute brought to
a position of prominence in Anglo-American law, remains as a pitfall
for the unwary. The courts have applied the statute of frauds rather
harshly in some cases and rather liberally in others, resulting in a con-
siderable lack of uniformity. As is the situation in many of the other
jurisdictions in this country, the cases in Washington are confused and
almost impossible to reconcile. This is particularly unfortunate due to
the drastic effects the statute of frauds can have when it is deemed
applicable.
The English statute of frauds is the law in Washington 2 "so far as it
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws ... of the state of
Washington nor incompatible with the institutions and condition of
society in this state, .. ."' This Comment is concerned with the problem
of whether the Washington statutes have entirely displaced the English
statute in regard to the requirement of a writing and with some of the
problems presented by the application of the statutes of frauds in
Washington.4
WILLS
Sections 5 and 6 and 19 through 23 of the English statute of frauds
were concerned with the formalities of execution and revocation of wills
and with the requirements of nuncupative wills. These provisions have
been preserved in the Washington statutes, in modified form,' in RCW
11.12.020 and RCW 11.12.040. These Washington statutes appear to
have superseded the comparable sections of the English statute com-
pletely.
SALE OF GOODS
Section 17 of the English statue, which relates to the sale of goods,
was copied into section 4 of the English Sale of Goods Act of 1893, with
1 An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677).
2 Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 28 Pac. 1109 (1892) ; Richards v. Redelsheimer,
36 Wash. 325, 78 Pac. 934 (1904).
3 RCW 4.04.010; WASH. CONST. art. XXVII, § 2.
4 The sufficiency of a writing to satisfy the statute of frauds is beyond the scope of
this Comment, as is the effect of full or part performance of a contract.
5 The principal differences are that the English statute required "three or four
witnesses," while the Washington statute requires only two; and the English version
was limited to devises of land and tenements, which is not the case in Washington.
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minor changes. The Sale of Goods Act, in turn, served as the founda-
tion for the Uniform Sales Act,' and this provision is presently found
-in the Washington statutes in RCW 63.04.050.'
CONTRACTS
Sections 1 through 4 and 7 through 9 require more detailed treat-
ment.' Section 4, which perhaps is the most widely known section of
the English statute of frauds, was incorporated into the Washington
statutes in RCW 19.36.010,1 the Washington contract statute of frauds,
with two important variations. Part 4 of that section, which provides
that no action shall be brought "upon any contract or sale of lands,
tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them,"
unless in writing, was omitted from RCW 19.36.010. Also, the provision
that "no action shall be brought" upon unwritten contracts was dis-
carded in favor of a statement that such contracts "shall be void." The
latter variation was made the basis of the holding in Hendry v. Bird."
That case held that contracts within the terms of RCW 19.36.010 are
void and that this raises the question of whether a cause of action is
stated. If none is stated, then Rule on Appeal 43 will permit an objec-
tion for the first time on appeal. Under this interpretation the statute
bars the right, and not just the remedy. This result is contrary to that
reached under section 4 of the English statute, which has been held to
be procedural only," and which must be pleaded to be given effect.
6 The statute of frauds section of the Uniform Sales Act applies to sales of choses
in action as well as to sales of goods, which is an addition to the coverage of the
English statutes. Both the Sale of Goods Act and the Uniform Sales Act use the
phrase "shall not be enforceable by action," in contrast with "no contract... shall be
allowed to be good, except..." in the English statute of frauds.
7 The Uniform Sales Act, which was enacted in Washington in 1925, displaced a
prior sales statute of frauds which used the terminology "shall be void." See Ayer,
The Uniform Sales Act in the State of Washington, 2 WASH. L. REy. 65, 145, 225 at
69 (1927).
8 The remaining sections of the English statute of frauds, 10 through 16 and 24 and
25, do not involve the requirement of a writing and are not relevant to the subject of
this Comment.
9 RCW 19.36.010. "In the following cases, specified in this section, any agreement,
contract and promise shall be void, unless such agreement, contract or promise, or
some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized, that is to
say: (1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed in one year from
the making thereof; (2) Every special promise to answer for the debt, default, or
misdoings of another person; (3) Every agreement, promise or undertaling made
upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry; (4) Every special
promise made by an executor or administrator to answer damages out of his own
estate; (5) An agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to sell or
purchase real estate for compensation or a commission."
The last part, part 5, was not in the English statute, but was added to RCW
19.36.010 by amendment in 1905. Part 4 also appears in RCW 11.48.040.
1o 135 Wash. 174, 237 Pac. 317 (1925).
11 Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801, 138 E.R. 1119 (1852).
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INTERESTS iN LAND
The greatest departure from the English statute of frauds in Wash-
ington is found in the area of real property transactions. For this
reason, that area demands the most attention in this Comment. The
provisions of the English statute which relate to real property transac-
tions, other than section 4(4) which was noted above, are substantially
as follows:
Section 1. Leases, estates, interests of freehold, or terms of years,
or any uncertain interest of, in or out of any lands, tenements or
hereditaments, created by parol, and not put into writing and signed
by the parties creating the same, shall have the force and effect of
leases or estates at will only.
Section 2. Leases not exceeding a term of three years are excepted
when the rent reserved for the term amounts to two-thirds of the value
of the thing demised.
Section 3. No leases, estates, or interests, either of freehold or
terms of years, or any uncertain interest in, to or out of any lands,
tenements or hereditaments, shall be assigned, granted or surrendered,
unless it be by deed or note in writing, signed by the party so assign-
ing, granting or surrendering the same.
Section 7. All declarations or creations of trusts of any lands,
tenements or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by some
writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such
trust, or by his last will in writing, or else they shall be utterly void
and of no effect.
Section 8. Trusts created by operation of law are excepted.
Section 9. All grants and assignments of any trust shall likewise
be in writing, signed by the party granting or assigning the same.
The principal12 Washington statutes which have replaced these sec-
tions are RCW 59.04.010,1" which provides, in part, that "Leases may
be in writing or print, or partly in writing and partly in print, and shall
be valid for a term not exceeding one year, without acknowledgment,
witnesses, or seals"; and the two following statutes:
RCW 64.04.010. Every conveyance of real estate or any interest
therein, and every contract creating or evidencing an encumbrance
upon real estate, shall be by deed... 14
12 It should be noted that RCW 26.16.040, which requires a wife to join her husband
in conveying or encumbering community real property, has not been treated as a
statute of frauds. Ratification is a defense, which is not true under the statute of
frauds. See Spreitzer v. Miller, 98 Wash. 601, 168 Pac. 179 (1917). It is not clear
whether part performance will defeat this statute. However, the court has indicated
that sufficient part performance, under the appropriate circumstances, might support a
plea of estoppel. Kaufman v. Pekkins, 114 Wash. 40, 194 Pac. 802 (1921).
13 This statute has remained unchanged since it was first enacted in 1881.
14 The proviso which excepts certificates evidencing an interest in a trust of record
is omitted. It was added by amendment in 1929. From 1915 to 1929, this provision was
[VoL. 34
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
RCW 64.04.020. Every deed shall be in writing, signed by the party
bound thereby, and acknowledged by the party before some person
authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds.Yr
The pattern of statutes in Washington was fairly well developed
before statehood. As a result of this, little evidence remains, except the
statutes themselves, to serve as the basis for a determination of legisla-
tive intent. However, on its face it appears that RCW 64.04.010 was
intended to cover all types of real property transactions except leases
for terms not exceeding one year, which are covered by RCW 59.04.010.
This would explain the abandonment of the English practice of enumer-
ating specific types of transactions. This would also indicate that the
legislature intended to provide for every type of transaction mentioned
in the English statute of frauds. As will be seen later in this discussion,
the present state of the case law in Washington indicates that there is
serious question whether this result was accomplished.
Perhaps a more important problem is raised by the acknowledgment
requirement. Why do the statutes require an acknowledgment as well
as the writing required by the English statute? Should it have some
substantive effect, or is it simply intended to be a formality? These
questions are difficult to answer, and the statutes provide little aid.
The only statute which gives any clear indication of the purpose of the
requirement is RCW 64.08.050, which requires that the certificate of
the acknowledging officer recite "in substance that the person, known
to him as the person whose name is signed to the instrument as executing
it, acknowledged before him that he executed it freely and voluntarily,
on the date stated in the certificate, which certificate shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein recited." However, this statute fol-
lows RCW 64.08.040, which sets forth the requirements of valid ac-
knowledgment outside of the state. It is at least arguable that it has
relevance only in that situation. 6 If it is proper to read RCW 64.08.050
in conjunction with RCW 64.04.020, it seem that acknowledgment of
deeds within the state should have some substantive effects as well as
procedural or evidential effects. A statement that the instrument was
executed freely and voluntarily, made before an acknowledging officer,
contained in what is now RCW 64.04.020. Other than this one addition, RCW
64.04.010 has continued substantially in its present form since the Code of 1854.
15 The requirements of a writing and an acknowledgment have been in this section
of the statutes since 1854. In addition to these requirements, from 1854 to 1888 tvo
witnesses were required for the execution of a deed.
16 These two statutes were added to the deed section of the code together in 1879
and are found in the same order in the Code of 1881 in sections 2320 and 2321. The
present form of these statutes, which was established in 1929, varies somewhat from
the original form.
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should have the effect of being a deterent to coercion and fraud in the
execution of deeds. The contention that acknowledgment should be
substantive is supported by the fact that the requirements of a writing
and an acknowledgment are contained in the same sentence in RCW
64.04.020, and are preceded there by the mandatory word "shall."
Acknowledgment of deeds is required by statute in many jurisdic-
tions. Generally, the type of statute controls the purpose and effect of
the acknowledgment. Most jurisdictions require acknowledgment either
as a prerequisite of recording or as a means of admitting the instrument
into evidence without further proof of execution. Under these types of
statutes the instrument is valid between the parties, their heirs, and
assigns without acknowledgment. A few jurisdictions have statutes
which make acknowledgment essential to the validity of the instrument,
which is not enforceable without it, even between the parties."
In Washington acknowledgment of deeds is made a prerequisite of
recording by RCW 65.08.060 and RCW 65.08.070, although this was
not expressly so provided before these statutes were enacted in 1927."s
Since this is true, what purpose does the requirement of acknowledg-
ment in the deed statute, RCW 64.04.020, serve now? Is it intended to
have only an evidential effect, if it even has that, or is it intended to be
a substantive requirement for validity? Unfortunately, the Washington
court has seldom considered the purpose of the requirement, and the
Washington cases shed little light on the subject.
Any theories that might be evolved regarding the requirements or
applicability of the Washington statutes must inevitably consider the
interpretation that these statutes have received in the Washington
cases. However, different types of transactions must be treated sep-
arately here because of the wide disparity in treatment that they have
received by the court.
Leases. The first three sections of the English statute of frauds apply
to leases. Whether these sections were entirely displaced by RCW
64.04.010, and RCW 59.04.010, is perhaps still open to question. One
of the few cases that have mentioned the problem is the early case of
Richards v. Redelsheimer."9 In that case the court decided that a lease
17See 7 THOMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § § 3991-3993 (perm. ed. 1940) ; 4 TIFFANY,
REALPROPERTY § 1027 (3d ed. 1939).8 In the Code of 1854 acknowledgment was not mentioned in conjunction with re-
cording, although it was provided for in the predecessor of RCW 64.04.020. The require-
ment of acknoledgment for recording did not appear in the statutes until 1927.
19 36 Wash. 325, 78 Pac. 934 (1904).
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is an encumbrance within the meaning of RCW-64.04.010,0 and there-
fore must be created by deed. The court could well have found that a
leasehold was an interest in real estate; however, it chose to rely upon
an earlier case construing the community property statutes.2 1 The court
then found that RCW 59.04.010 excepted leases for terms not exceeding
one year from the deed statutes. After finding that an oral lease for over
one year cannot be sustained as a tenancy at will under section 1 of the
English statute, since "that statute is superseded by [RCW 64.04.010],"
the court held that the only way such a lease could be sustained was as
a periodic tenancy under RCW 59.04.020. The court also went on to
find that RCW 19.36.010 is not applicable to leases.
Up to this point in the decision, the court had made it fairly clear
that it felt that the first two sections of the English statute have no
further applicability in Washington."2 However, the court went even
further, and said that the English statute of frauds relating to real
property had been entirely superseded by the Washington statutes.
This statement was perhaps too broad, and was certainly not necessary
to the decision.
When the court reached the principal issue of the case, whether a
contract to execute a lease must be in writing, it held that contracts to
execute leases come within the statute of frauds the same as leases, since
otherwise an oral lease could be construed to be a contract to execute
a lease, and thus the statute of frauds would be avoided. The reasoning
which would permit a lease to be construed to be a contract for a lease
was not explained by the court. However, the holding -of the Redels-
heimer case, that contracts to execute leases must be by deed, in writing
and acknowledged, was followed in Omak Realty Investment Co. v.
Dewey-2 3
The rule that leases for over one year must be acknowledged to be
enforceable between the parties has been uniformly followed.2" This
2 0 From 1888 to 1929 this statute provided "that all conveyances of real estate, or ol
any interest therein, and all contracts creating or evidencing any incumbrance upon
real estate shall be by deed." The published report of the Redelsheimer case, which
was decided in 1904, misquoted the statute, omitting the words "creating or."
21 This holding was based upon the decision of Hoover v. Chambers, 3 Wash. Terr.
26, 13 Pac. 547 (1887), which held that a lease was an encumbrance within the meaning
of the community property statutes. The Hoover case, in turn, relied upon a number
of decisions in other jurisdictions in which the issue was marketable title.
22 It is still possible to argue that the application of section 1 to freehold interests
was not precluded by this case.
23 129 Wash. 385, 225 Pac. 236 (1924).2 4 E.g., Garbick v. Franz, 13 Vn.2d 427, 125 P.2d 295 (1942) ; Central Building Co.
v. Keystone Shares Corp., 185 Wash. 645, 56 P.2d 697 (1936) ; Jamison v. Reilly, 92
Wash. 538, 159 Pac. 699 (1916) ; National Laundry Co. v. Mayer, 79 Wash. 212, 140
Pac. 393 (1914).
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indicates that the purpose of the acknowledgment requirement is not
merely evidentiary but is substantive as well. RCW 59.04.010 lends
some support to this view, by negative implication, by saying that leases
"shall be valid for a term not exceeding one year, without acknowledg-
ment.... ." However, this statute alone hardly supports the rule that
leases for over one year must be acknowledged in order to be valid. The
Redelskeimer case indicates that the court was relying upon RCW
64.04.020 when it reached that result.
In American Savings Bank v. Mafridge,5 the court held that Wash-
ington does not have a statute which requires a written assignment of a
leasehold interest to be acknowledged. This would seem to strengthen
the proposition that leases come under the terms of RCW 64.04.010
as encumbrances, and not as interests in real estate. Clearly, if lease-
holds were interests in real estate they would have to be conveyed by
deed. However, RCW 64.04.010 does not appear to require that the
transfer of an encumbrance must be by deed. The next problem is, if
they are only encumbrances, what statute, if any, requires that the
assignment of leases be in writing? This question was presented to the
court in Mobley v. Harkins,28 and it was left undecided. It appears
that RCW 64.04.010 is not applicable unless such an assignment creates
or evidences an encumbrance upon real estate. Since the encumbrance,
the lease, is already in existence at the time of an assignment, it can
hardly be created again. It seems almost as unlikely that such an assign-
ment evidences an encumbrance. On the other hand, section 3 of the
English statute of frauds clearly requires that assignments of leases be
in writing. Perhaps the court was premature in dismissing the English
statute so summarily in the Redelsheimer case.
Conveyances. Conveyances of real property are clearly included
within the coverage of RCW 64.04.010. It would be difficult even to
raise an argument that the English statute of frauds still has any
applicability to this type of transaction in Washington. The require-
ment of a writing has never been seriously contested. The problem
which has been frequently litigated here is whether an acknowledgment
is required. The first reported case that faced this problem was Mann
v. Young. 7 There the court held that in equity an unacknowledged deed
was valid as against the grantor and all persons claiming under him with
notice. Twenty years later in Edson v. Knox," the court held that an
25 60 Wash. 180; 110 Pac. 1015 (1910).
2614 Wn.2d 276, 128 P2d 289 (1942).
27 1 Wash. Terr. 454 (1874).
28 8 Wash. 642, 36 Pac. 698 (1894).
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unacknowledged deed could be maintained as a contract for a deed,"
that the contract conveyed full equitable title to the grantee, and that
the grantor and those holding under him were estopped in equity to
assert legal title. Carson v. Thompson,"0 decided the same year as the
Edson case, likewise said that as between the parties an unacknowledged
deed passes equitable title.
These cases involve the same type of avoidance of the statutory re-
quirements that led the court in the Redelsheimer case, supra, to apply
the same rules to contracts to execute leases that it did to leases them-
selves. There the court reasoned that a lease could be construed to be a
contract to execute a lease, and that therefore a contract to execute a
lease must satisfy the lease requirements or the statutory requirements
for leases would be avoided. In the deed cases the reasoning is reversed.
The court has assumed that a contract to convey does not require
acknowledgment and then has construed an unacknowledged deed to
be a contract to convey.
It should be noted that the doctrine of equitable conversion, which
supported the result in the Edson case, has been somewhat weakened in
Washington by the case of Ashford v. Reese.8 However, notwithstand-
ing the Ashford case, the rule of the Edson case is now so well en-
trenched that no reason is deemed necessary for enforcing an unac-
knowledged instrument32 against a grantor, his heirs, or those claiming
under him with notice."
The court adds nothing by saying that an unacknowledged deed is
not valid against a purchaser for value without notice. The recording
statutes already compel this result, and the deed statutes coiltribute
nothing. The rule the court has followed regarding the acknowledgment
of conveyances reduces the requirement of acknowledgment in the deed
statutes to one possible effect only, that of making the certificate "prima
facie evidence of the facts therein recited." This should be contrasted
with the substantive effect given the requirement in the lease cases.
Mortgages. At the time the English statute of frauds was enacted
there was no good reason for making a special provision for mortgages.
21 Chamberlain v. Abrams, 36 Wash. 587, 79 Pac. 204 (1905), did not follow this
rule in the case of a quitclaim deed, when the grantor had no title at the time of execu-
tion.
o 10 Wash. 295, 38 Pac. 1116 (1894).
1 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).32 Although the court has said that the deed is enforceable, so far the court has only
enforced the conveyance. No attempt has been made yet to enforce other personal obli-
gations set forth in the instrument.
33 E.g., Ockfen v. Ockfen, 35 Wn.2d 439, 213 P.2d 614 (1950) ; it re Deaver's Estate,
151 Wash. 454, 276 Pac. 296 (1929).
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At that time a mortgage was a conveyance with a defeasance clause.
This is no longer the case. A mortgage in Washington gives the mort-
gagee only a lien and not the full legal title.84 However, the Washington
court has continued to treat mortgages of real property much the same
as conveyances insofar as the statute of frauds is concerned. Apparently
the court has assumed that real estate mortgages are covered by RCW
64.04.010 without explaining how. The apparent statutory requirement
of an acknowledgment is disposed of by the court in the same manner
that it is disposed of in the conveyance cases. 5 If RCW 64.04.010
applies, how does it apply? The only interest that a mortgage conveys
is a lienor's interest. Is this adequate to support the application of the
statute or is the court relying upon the encumbrance clause? The latter
possibility appears to be the most likely. This conclusion seems to be
supported by RCW 61.12.010, which is found in the real estate mort-
gage section of the Code. It provides that "encumbrances shall be by
deed," but it does not define a mortgage as an encumbrance. However,
its position in the statutes arguably supports the conclusion that a
mortgage is an encumbrance within the meaning of the deed statutes.
If a mortgage is an encumbrance under RCW 64.04.010, the reason-
ing of the-Redelskeimer case, supra, would seem to require that a con-
tract to execute a mortgage must satisfy the deed statutes. The case
of a completely executory contract to execute a mortgage appears never
to have been presented to the Washington court. However, in Flcish-
bein v. Tkorne86 the court considered the enforceability of an oral
contract to execute a mortgage when the intended mortgagee had
already fully performed. The court decided that, since the intended
mortgagee had fully performed, the contract was to be treated as an
equitable mortgage, and was not within the operation of the statute of
frauds."' Of more interest here is the fact that the court indicated that a
writing would normally be required. In the recent case of Thompson v.
Hunstad"8 the court was again presented with an oral contract to execute
84 E.g., Bloomer v. Southwest Washington Production Credit Ass'n, 36 Wn.2d 752,
220 P.2d 324 (1950) ; State ex rel. Gwinn, Inc. v. Superior Court, 170 Wash. 463, 16
P.2d 831 (1932) ; Spokane Sav. & Loan Soc'y v. Park Vista Improvement Co., 160
Wash. 12, 294 Pac. 1028 (1930).
35 E.g., Bremner v. Shafer, 181 Wash. 376, 43 P.2d 27 (1935) ; Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Nichols, 124 Wash. 403, 214 Pac. 820 (1923) ; Lynch v. Cade, 41 Wash. 216, 83
Pac. 118 (1905).
56193 Wash. 65, 74 P.2d 880 (1937).
37 A contract fully executed on one side is sometimes treated as being outside of the
reach of the statute of frauds. Gerard-Fillio Co. v. McNair, 68 Wash. 321, 123 Pac.
462(1912) ; Clements v. Cook, 112 Wash. 217, 191 Pac. 874 (1920).
s8 153 Wash. Dec. 73, 330 P.2d 1007 (1958).
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a mortgage, fully performed by the intended mortgagee. The court said
that "the plaintiff concedes that the statute of frauds (RCW 64.04.010)
applies to the alleged agreement, since it pertains to an interest in land."
This decision did not mention the Fleishbein case. Even though the
two cases are irreconcilable, they both indicate that a fully executory
contract to execute a mortgage must be in writing. Why? The court
has not given an answer. Perhaps when presented with another case
on the point the theory which the court evolves will also impose the
requirement of an acknowledgment.
Contracts to Convey. 9 Under the English statute of frauds, con-
tracts to convey were covered by section 4(4), which, as was noted
above, was deleted by the territorial legislature when it adopted RCW
19.36.010. The problem here is where such contracts fit into the Wash-
ington statutes, if they fit in at all. If not, is section 4(4) of the English
statute still in effect in Washington?
A good case can be made for the proposition that a contract to convey
should come within the terms of RCW 64.04.010, either as a conveyance
of an "interest" in real estate, or as a "contract creating or evidencing
an encumbrance upon real estate," or both. Before Ashford v. Reese 4
was decided, it seemed fairly clear that Washington followed the ortho-
dox rule of equitable conversion.4 This rule, which provides that the
vendee in an executory contract for the sale of land has full equitable
title, has been followed almost universally, both in England and in the
United States. Even though the Ashlord case cast some doubt upon the
applicability of this doctrine to forfeitable contracts,42 it still quite
dearly applies to non-forfeitable contracts." Under equitable conver-
sion, the court could have found that a contract to convey conveys an
"interest" in real estate, even though it is only an equitable interest.
This position would have had the added effect of placing subsequent
transfers of the vendee's interest in the contract within the terms of
RCW 64.04.010. This result would appear to be impossible without
8" This category includes contracts to convey by will.
40 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925).
41 Taylor v. Interstate Inv. Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 Pac. 240 (1913).
42 See Comment, The Vendor-Purchaser Relationship in Washington, 22 WAsH. L.
REv. 110 (1947) ; Schweppe, The New Forfeiture Clause Test in Executory Contractsfor the Sale of Real Estate, 3 WAsH. L. Rv. 80 (1928) ; Schweppe, Rights of a
Vendee Under an Executory Forfeitable Contract for the Purchase of Real Estate:
A Further Word on the Washington Law, 2 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1926).43 Dean v. Woodruff, 200 Wash. 166, 93 P.2d 357 (1939) ; First Nat'l Bank v. Map-
son, 181 Wash. 196, 42 P.2d 782 (1935) ; Aylbard v. Lally, 147 Wash. 29, 264 Pac. 983
(1928).
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first finding that the contract transferred an interest in real estate to
the vendee.44
The second alternative for the court would have been to find that
such contracts created or evidenced an encumbrance upon real estate.
The general rule in the marketable title cases is that an outstanding
contract to convey is an encumbrance." Although "encumbrance" does
not necessarily have the same meaning in all situations, title cases were
relied upon in the Redelsheimer case to support a finding that a lease
is an encumbrance within the meaning of RCW 64.04.010. 4" The
analogy should be as valid in the contract area as it is in the lease area.
Unfortunately for the clarity of the law, the court has failed to discuss
either of the foregoing possibilities.
When presented with the problem of whether an oral contract to
convey is enforceable, the Washington court quite commonly has said
that RCW 64.04.010 requires such contracts to be in writing,41 when
it refers to a specific statute at all."' However, one early case, Anderson
v. Wallace Lumber and Mfg. Co.,49 concluded that RCW 64.04.010 was
not applicable to contracts to convey. This case appears to have little
validity as authority now in view of the later cases on this point. It is
quite clear that a written contract to convey is enforceable in Washing-
ton without an acknowledgment." One case that deviated from this
rule and required an acknowledgment was Sherlock v. Van Asselt?'
Later, in Fallers v. Pring,52 the Sherlock holding was dismissed as an
"improvident statement, not necessary to the decision of the case...."
The present rule of the cases is that a contract to convey must be in
writing, but does not have to be acknowledged. 8 The reasoning behind
44 Even the English statute gives little help here unless the vendee acquires some
interest in real property.
45 See 2 Patton, TITLES § 598 (2d ed. 1957).
46 See discussion, note 21, supra.
47 E.g., State ex rel. Wirt v. Superior Court, 10 Wn.2d 362, 116 P.2d 752 (1941);
Peterson v. Nichols, 110 Wash. 288, 188 Pac. 498 (1920); Nichols v. Oppermann, 6
Wash. 618, 34 Pac. 162 (1893).
48 In Blakely v. Sumner, 62 Wash. 206, 113 Pac. 257 (1911), the court said that the
"universal ruling of all courts" requires contracts to convey to be in writing. No
statute was cited.
49 30 Wash. 147, 70 Pac. 247 (1902).50 E.g., Phillip v. Curtis, 35 Wn.2d 844, 215 P.2d 431 (1950) ; First Nat'l Bank v.
Conway, 87 Wash. 506, 151 Pac. 1129 (1915) ; Anderson v. Wallace Lumber and Mlfg.
Co., 30 Wash. 147, 70 Pac. 247 (1902) ; National Bank v. Hughson, 5 Wash. 100, 31
Pac. 423 (1892).51 34 Wash. 141, 75 Pac. 639 (1904).
52 144 Wash. 224, 257 Pac. 627 (1927).
53 For a case where the court enforced an agreement to convey contained in an
unacknowledged lease, see Phillip v. Curtis, 35 Wn.2d 844, 215 P.2d 431 (1950).
Although the lease was void under the normal ruling of the court, the option to pur-
chase contained in the lease was enforced.
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this rule is obscure. A typical explanation was given in First Nat'l Bank
v. Conway." The court said, "In this state executory contracts for the
conveyance of real property, while required to be in writing, are not
specialties, but are simple contracts, valid when signed by the parties
to be charged, whether or not they are executed with the formalities
required for the execution of deeds."" It is possible that the court has
found that RCW 64.04.010 does not apply to such transactions and is
applying section 4(4) of the English statute instead." This proposition
is weakened by the fact that the court has said that RCW 64.04.010
requires such contracts to be in writing. Also, the English statute of
frauds has not been clearly recognized as being applicable. Another
possibility is that the court is applying RCW 64.04.010 and is treating
the acknowledgment requirement here the same as it did in the convey-
ance cases. However, there the court relied upon equitable conversion
and estoppel. In those cases it was necessary for the court to assume
that a contract to convey is valid without acknowledgment, because
equitable conversion could not operate on a void contract. In the con-
tract to convey cases it seems there is nothing upon which equitable
conversion could operate if the contract is not valid. Estoppel might
explain the result, but the court has made no attempt to explain it on
that basis. It appears to be impossible to determine exactly what the
court is doing in this type of case.
Express Trusts in Real Property." Sections 7 and 9 of the English
statute of frauds required that express trusts in real property be mani-
fested and proved by a writing and that an assignment of such trusts be
in writing. As was mentioned before, these provisions were omitted
from the Washington statutes. The same problem is presented here
that was presented in the discussion of contracts to convey: What
Washington statute, if any, applies to such transactions. As is the case
where oral contracts to convey are involved, when the court is asked
to enforce an oral express trust it is willing to say that RCW 64.04.010
requires such trusts to be in writing." Just how that statute applies is
5 87 Wash. 506, 151 Pac. 1129 (1915).
5Id. at 515, 151 Pac. at 1132.
5" This conclusion was reached, based upon the cases available in 1903, in McAvoy,
Statue of Frauds in Relation to Land Contracts in the State of Washington, 1903 (un-
published thesis in the University of Washington Law School Library).
57 This category is properly limited to the creation of the equitable interest in the
beneficiary. The fact that a conveyance of the legal title to a third party, the trustee,
may be involved also is not pertinent here. The conveyance is controlled by the same
rules that control other conveyances.
r" E.g., In re Swartwood & Welsher Estates, 198 Wash. 557, 89 P.2d 203 (1939);
Pacheco v. Mello, 139 Wash. 566, 247 Pac. 927 (1926) ; Nichols v. Capen, 79 Wash.
120, 139 Pac. 868 (1914).
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not clear. It does not seem that an express truts conveys an "interest"
in real estate any more than does a contract to convey. 9 In both situa-
tions only an equitable interest is transferred. However, this was the
line of reasoning used in Eggert v. Ford"O in order to find that an express
trust is a "conveyance" within the meaning of the recording statutes,"1
thus requiring an acknowledgment before a trust in writing can be
recorded.
The other possibility under RCW 64.04.010, that an express trust is
an "encumbrance" within the meaning of the statute, has been stated
with approval in at least one case involving an oral express trust. 2 If a
trust is an encumbrance, why is a contract to convey not an encum-
brance? Both leave the legal title unaffected.
Apparently the only case which has raised the issue of whether an
acknowledgment is necessary for express trusts in writing is the Eggert
case. However, all that case decided was that an express trust in land
must be acknowledged before it can be recorded. This does not answer
the question of whether such a trust must be acknowledged before it can
be enforced, since unrecorded instruments are still enforceable between
the parties." Executory contracts to convey must also be acknowledged
before they can be recorded;" yet they are clearly enforceable without
acknowledgment.
Although the case law is not fully enough developed to indicate
whether acknowledgment is a requisite of enforceability, there appears
to be good reason for applying the same rules to express trusts in land
that are applied to contracts to convey.
SuMARY
Although the rules are fairly clear regarding when the requirement
of a writing will be imposed, and when acknowledgment is required,
there is no consistent pattern to be found in all of the cases. The major
difficulty is that the court has failed to state any theory regarding what
the statutes are intended to accomplish. Too often the court has relied
59 It might be argued that, by amending RCW 64.04.010 to exclude certain transfers
of a beneficiary's interest, the legislature recognized that a beneficiary has an interest
within the meaning of that statute. If this is true, the trust transferred an interest when
created. A necessary result of this line of reasoning is that RCW 64.04.010 applies to
equitable "interests" as well as to legal "interests" This would carry over into the
area of contracts to convey. See note 14, spra.021 Wn.2d 152, 150 P.2d 719 (1944).
61 RCW 65.08.060 and RCW 65.08.070.
2Spaulding v. Collins, 51 Wash. 488, 99 Pac. 306 1909).
63 J. W. Fales Co. v. 0. H. Seiple Co., 171 Wash. 630, 19 P.2d 118 (1933).
64 RCW 65.08.080.
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upon the text treatment of the statutes in other jurisdictions rather than
making an attempt to construe the Washington statutes. At this point
of deveolpment, an attempt to apply a consistent approach to all types
of transactions could cause some individual hardship, due to the retro-
active effect of court decisions. However, the present state of the law
leaves many questions unanswered. For instance, why should acknowl-
edgment be given substantive effect in the lease area when it has no
such effect elsewhere? The statutes do not justify the result. Why
should a contract to execute a lease be treated differently than a con-
tract to execute a conveyance? Does the English statute of frauds have
any efficacy in Washington today? If not, does RCW 64.04.010 apply
to all real property transactions except leases for terms less than one
year? If this is the case, why is the acknowledgment requirement ex-
cused in some instances? Does RCW 64.04.010 apply to equitable
interests in real property?
A possible rule to follow would be to hold that RCW 64.04.010
applies to all real property transactions and to require acknowledgment
as a substantive requirement in all instances. The effect of this rule
would not be as drastic as it first appears, since most types of instru-
ments are already acknowledged for purposes of recording. The court
would still have the doctrine of part performance to apply to achieve a
desirable result when necessary. However, this would require that
a considerable number of cases be overruled.
Perhaps a better rule would be to hold that acknowledgment never
has substantive effect, even in the lease cases. Since this is a more
lenient approach, very little hardship would be created. Also, this
would tend to make it irrelevant whether the court is relying upon
64.04.010 or the English statute of frauds. A third approach would be
to find that there are some transactions which were omitted from the
Washington statutes. It would then be necessary to look to the English
statute of frauds as well as to the Washington statutes.
Before leaving this discussion, it might be well to note the possible
effect of RCW 19.36.010(1), the "one-year" section, if the court should
begin relying upon the English statute of frauds. Although the Redel-
sheimer case, supra, appears to preclude the applicability of this section
to leases, it has been applied to both contracts to convey" and express
trusts.6" If the only statute of frauds applicable in these areas otherwise
is the English statute, it seems it should be displaced by the express
11 Foelkner v. Perkins, 197 Wash. 462, 85 P.2d 1095 1938).
o Moe v. Brumfield, 27 Wn.2d 714, 179 P.2d 968 (1947).
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Washington statutory provision, when applicable. This would raise the
question of whether the doctrine of part performance could be applied
in order to avoid the effect of the statute. In two cases 7 the court held
that this doctrine is not applicable to RCW 19.36.010(1). However, in
two later cases"8 the court ignored its earlier holdings and applied the
doctrine to cases under this statute. What the court would do with the
problem now is not clear. Another consideration is the possible effect
of the court's ruling that contracts violating the provisions of RCW
19.36.010 are void, and not merely voidable. As was noted before, this
is directly contrary to the result reached under section 4 of the English
statute of frauds.
617Hendry v. Bird, 135 Wash. 174, 237 Pac. 317 (1925) ; Union Sav. & Trust Co. v.
Krunm, 88 Wash. 20, 152 Pac. 681 (1915).
6s Sunset Oil Co. v. Vertner, 34 Wn.2d 268, 208 P.2d 906 (1949) ; Foelkner v. Per-
kins, 197 Wash. 462, 85 P.2d 1095 (1938).
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